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VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Group Against Smog and Pollution, Incorporated 
(“GASP”) filed suit against Shenango, Incorporated 
(“Shenango”) in the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania pursuant to the citizen suit provision 
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of the Clean Air Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). The 
District Court granted Shenango’s motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, filed pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1). The District Court 
found that the administrative agencies were already 
“diligently prosecuting” the Clean Air Act violations alleged 
by GASP, and therefore GASP’s action was prohibited by the 
diligent prosecution bar of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b)(1)(B); (App. 13–14). We will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court on other grounds, concluding that GASP 
has failed to state a claim because administrative agencies 
were “diligently prosecuting” the Clean Air Act violations 
and that this prosecution “requires compliance” with the Act. 
In making this determination, we conclude that the diligent 
prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act is not a jurisdictional 
limitation and is therefore properly dismissed through a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, rather than Rule 12(b)(1). 
   
I. 
INTRODUCTION  
 Shenango operates the Neville Island Coke Plant, a 
coke manufacturing and by-products recovery facility in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.1 (App. 3). The Neville 
                                              
1 The Neville Island Coke Plant “performs destructive 
distillation of coal to produce metallurgical coke and by-
products such as tar, light oil, sodium phenolate, and 
ammonium sulfate. Coke oven gas . . . fuel, which is used to 
underfire the coke battery and to fuel the boilers, is also 
produced.” (App. 90).  
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Island Coke Plant is subject to National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (“NAAQS”) set by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) pursuant to the 
Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–09; (App. 3–4). As part of 
the Act’s encouragement of federal cooperation with state and 
local governments, Pennsylvania is required to create a “state 
implementation plan,” (“SIP”) detailing how it will attain and 
maintain the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. Once the EPA 
approves the SIP, it becomes binding federal law. Id. § 7413. 
In Allegheny County, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
delegates the authority for enforcing air pollution laws to the 
Allegheny County Health Department (“ACHD”). (App. 4). 
The ACHD has promulgated emissions standards that are 
incorporated in the Pennsylvania SIP and are thereby binding 
federal law under the Clean Air Act. See ACHD Rules and 
Regulations Art. XXI. Three ACHD regulations are at issue 
in this case: 
  
First, Section 2105.21.b.1 restricts visible 
emissions from any battery of coke ovens to no 
more than five percent . . . of the door areas of 
the operating coke ovens (the “five percent door 
emissions standard”). Second, Section 
2105.21.f.3 prohibits combustion stack 
emissions with opacity greater than 20 percent 
for three minutes over a 60 minute period (the 
“20 percent combustion stack opacity 
standard”). Finally, Section 2105.21.f.4 
prohibits combustion stack emissions with 
opacity greater than 60 percent (the “60 percent 
combustion stack opacity standard”).  
(App. 4).     
 5 
 
 In 2012, the EPA, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (“DEP”), and the ACHD filed an 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania against Shenango claiming violations of these 
three standards. (App. 4–5). The parties entered into a 
Consent Decree to resolve these violations, specifically 
addressing the twenty and sixty percent combustion stack 
opacity standards. (Id.). The District Court entered final 
judgment on this action in 2012 but retained jurisdiction “for 
the purpose of modifying, construing and/or enforcing the 
rights and obligations of the Parties to this Consent Decree.” 
(Id. at 168–69, 174). 
  
 In 2014, GASP sent Shenango a notice of intent to sue, 
claiming violations of the same three standards. (Id. at 5). The 
ACHD then filed an action against Shenango in the 
Allegheny County Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, and 
the parties entered into a Consent Order and Agreement. (Id.). 
This Agreement appears to address the five percent door 
emissions standard, as discussed infra, and reaffirms the 2012 
Consent Decree’s approach to the twenty and sixty percent 
combustion stack opacity standards. (Id.). The Court of 
Common Pleas entered final judgment on this action on April 
8, 2014. (Id. at 106). The ACHD retained authority with 
respect to future violations and “to seek further enforcement 
of this Agreement” if Shenango fails to comply. (Id. at 95). 
The Consent Order and Agreement was intended to be jointly 
terminated by the parties upon Shenango’s compliance with 
certain conditions. (Id. at 105–06). 
  
 On May 8, 2014, GASP filed the instant citizen suit 
against Shenango in U.S. District Court, again claiming 
violations of the same three emissions standards. (Id. at 6, 19–
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29). Shenango moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Id. 
at 109–10). The District Court found the issue presented to be 
jurisdictional. (Id. at 6). The Court granted Shenango’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
finding that GASP could not bring an action because the 
ACHD was already “diligently prosecut[ing]” an action in 
court against Shenango to require compliance under the Act. 
(Id. at 12–14). The Court rejected two arguments raised by 
GASP in opposition to the motion to dismiss: (1) that the 
Consent Decrees2 do not actually require Shenango to comply 
with the standards set forth in the Act; and (2) that the 2014 
Consent Order and Agreement was deficient because the 
parties failed to provide an opportunity for the public to 
intervene or comment on the terms of the order. (Id. at 11–
13). GASP timely appealed. (Id. at 1). 
          
II.3 
DISCUSSION 
 GASP raises two arguments on appeal: (1) that the 
diligent prosecution bar4 should not apply because no state or 
                                              
2 We refer to the 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 Consent 
Order and Agreement collectively as the “Consent Decrees.”  
 
3 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 through application of the citizen suit 
provision in 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). We have jurisdiction to 
review the final decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  
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administrative agency was actively “prosecuting” a civil 
action in court at the time GASP filed its present citizen suit; 
and (2) that the Consent Decrees from 2012 and 2014 do not 
“require compliance” with the Act. (Appellant’s Br. 16–18). 
In dealing with these issues we must first determine whether 
the diligent prosecution bar is jurisdictional or only a claim-
processing rule. The District Court proceeded assuming the 
bar was jurisdictional. (App. 6). We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions. CNA v. United 
States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008). 
        
 A. Nonjurisdictional Diligent Prosecution Bar  
 Amici curiae raise the issue of whether the diligent 
prosecution bar is jurisdictional and appropriately decided 
through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, or whether the diligent prosecution bar is 
nonjurisdictional and should be decided through a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.5 This 
                                                                                                     
4 The diligent prosecution bar, discussed infra, is a limitation 
on the Act’s citizen suit provision. It provides that a citizen 
suit may not be commenced “if the Administrator or State has 
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a 
court of the United States or a State to require compliance 
with the standard, limitation, or order.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b)(1)(B).   
 
5 While Appellant did not raise this argument and has 
consistently proceeded assuming the diligent prosecution bar 
is jurisdictional, “federal courts have an independent 
obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their 
jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 
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dichotomy is significant, “one of considerable practical 
importance for judges and litigants,” as “[b]randing a rule as 
going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal 
operation of our adversarial system.” Henderson ex rel. 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).6  
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “[o]n the subject-
matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-for-relief dichotomy, 
this Court and others have been less than meticulous.” 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006). Arbaugh 
instructs us that “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a 
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as 
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly 
instructed,” however “when Congress does not rank a 
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts 
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” 
546 U.S. at 515–16 (footnote omitted). The Court has 
described this as a “readily administrable bright line rule.” 
                                                                                                     
jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or 
elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 
562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) (citation omitted).  
 
6 The differences between a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim include: an objection to subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any time, a court may raise 
jurisdictional issues sua sponte, and a court may consider 
evidence beyond the pleadings such as testimony and 
depositions when considering a jurisdictional challenge. 
Henderson ex rel Henderson, 562 U.S. at 434–35; Gotha v. 
United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997).  
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Henderson ex rel. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435 (quoting 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 In Henderson, the Supreme Court distinguished claim-
processing rules, which “seek to promote the orderly progress 
of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain 
procedural steps at certain specified times,” from 
jurisdictional rules, which “govern[] a court’s adjudicatory 
capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.” 
Id. To distinguish these rules, the pivotal question as it 
applies to this case “is whether Congress mandated” the 
diligent prosecution bar to be “jurisdictional.” Id. There are 
no “magic words” Congress must use to express that a 
statutory requirement is jurisdictional. Id. at 436. Instead, we 
look “to the condition’s text, context, and relevant historical 
treatment” in determining whether the condition is 
jurisdictional. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 
166 (2010); see also Henderson ex rel. Henderson, 562 U.S. 
at 436 (stating the Court’s approach in Arbaugh “is suited to 
capture Congress’ likely intent and also provides helpful 
guidance for courts and litigants, who will be duly instructed 
regarding a rule’s nature”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Two circuit courts have interpreted Arbaugh in the 
context of a diligent prosecution bar in other acts7 and have 
                                              
7 While we rely on cases interpreting other environmental 
statutes in our present analysis of the Clean Air Act, we note 
that the legislative history of these other statutes explains that 
their citizen suit provisions and diligent prosecution bars were 
“modeled on” the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act. 
See Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the “Diligent 
Prosecution” Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10 Widener L. Rev. 63, 
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concluded the bar is nonjurisdictional. Louisiana Envtl. 
Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 745–49 
(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (interpreting the diligent 
prosecution bar of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(b)(1)(B)); Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 
483, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the diligent 
prosecution bar of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B)). 
  
 This Court has addressed questions regarding the 
diligent prosecution bar, not at issue here, in which the bar 
was referenced as jurisdictional. In these cases, we 
determined whether the administrative action in question was 
taken by a “court” for the purpose of applying the diligent 
prosecution bar. Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 
1131, 1135 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Because we find that the EPA’s 
action is not a ‘court’ proceeding (and fails the first prong of 
[the citizen suit bar]), we need not address the second issue of 
whether the consent order constitutes ‘diligent 
prosecution.’”); see also Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 
Inc., 592 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1979) (determining that the 
                                                                                                     
69 & n.31 (2003) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 
62 (1987) (explaining that “both the Senate and House 
Reports explicitly connected [the citizen suit provision of the 
Clean Water Act] to the citizen suit provisions authorized by 
the Clean Air Act”). Because the provisions serve a similar 
purpose in their respective statutes, courts commonly 
consider the interpretation of citizen suit provisions and 
diligent prosecution bars in other statutes in deciding the case 
at hand. Miller, supra, at 69 & n.32. 
 11 
 
district court had subject matter jurisdiction because the 
administrative action in question was not taken by a “court” 
under the diligent prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act). We 
did not consider in either case whether Congress intended the 
bar to be jurisdictional.8   
   
 We conclude that the diligent prosecution bar of the 
Clean Air Act is not a jurisdictional limitation. Beginning our 
analysis with the text of the statute, the language of the 
diligent prosecution bar does not “clearly state[] that a 
threshold limitation on [its] scope shall count as 
jurisdictional.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515. The language 
Congress used, “No action may be commenced,” is 
mandatory, but it is not stated in terms of the court’s 
adjudicatory capacity or jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b); see 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 439 (explaining 
that the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that all 
mandatory rules are jurisdictional). Congress could have 
expressly made the diligent prosecution bar jurisdictional by 
using the word “jurisdiction” or phrasing the language in 
terms of the court’s powers. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 
(“[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on 
coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction 
as nonjurisdictional in character.”). Shenango has not 
identified any specific text in the Act that indicates the 
diligent prosecution language should “count as 
jurisdictional.” Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 525 F.3d 255, 
                                              
8 Appellee does not cite cases in which any federal court 
engaged in an analysis of the diligent prosecution bar and 




261 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting requirements of Arbaugh, 546 
U.S. at 515–16) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
    
 In Henderson, the Supreme Court held that a 120-day 
notice requirement prior to filing an appeal to the Veterans 
Court was nonjurisdictional. 562 U.S. at 431. The Court 
interpreted the following statutory language: “In order to 
obtain review,” an appropriate person “shall file a notice of 
appeal with the Court within 120 days after the date on which 
notice of the decision is mailed.” Id. at 438 (quoting 38 
U.S.C. § 7266(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
Court distinguished this from language governing Federal 
Circuit review of Veterans Court decisions: “Federal Circuit 
review must be obtained within the time and in the manner 
prescribed for appeal to United States court of appeals from 
United States district courts.” Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. 
§ 7292(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because timing 
requirements for taking an appeal from a district court have 
long been considered jurisdictional, this latter language 
clearly signaled congressional intent for Federal Circuit 
review requirements to be jurisdictional. Id. at 438–39; see 
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209–14 (2007) (holding that 
statutory time limits for taking an appeal are jurisdictional 
based on their “longstanding treatment” as such by the 
Supreme Court). The former language, at issue in Henderson, 
is not framed in a manner that clearly states its intention to be 
jurisdictional or references similar treatment to a clearly 
jurisdictional limitation. 562 U.S. at 439. The Clean Air Act 
diligent prosecution bar, like the Henderson 120-day notice 
requirement, does not reference the court’s jurisdiction in any 
way nor is it phrased in a way that clearly suggests it is a 
jurisdictional requirement. We agree with the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation of the citizen suit provision in the 
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act that the “limits on 
citizen suits appear in separate provisions that do not ‘speak 
in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction 
of the district courts.’” Adkins, 644 F.3d at 492 (quoting Zipes 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).9 
  
 The Henderson Court also discussed the placement of 
statutory provisions in determining that the notice 
requirement in question was nonjurisdictional. 562 U.S. at 
439. The Clean Air Act title for 42 U.S.C. § 7604, “Citizen 
suits,” “can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s 
text.” Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Nat’l Ctr. for 
Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991). Congress 
further titled § 7604(a): “Authority to bring civil action; 
jurisdiction,” and § 7604(b): “Notice.” That these subsections 
are separately titled suggests they should be considered 
separate provisions. Rather than including the diligent 
prosecution bar within the exact provision granting 
jurisdiction, the diligent prosecution bar is part of this 
separate “Notice” provision. The “Notice” provision also 
requires the citizen to notify the involved administrative 
agencies at least sixty days prior to filing the citizen suit. 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A). This procedural rule is similar to the 
claim-processing rule in Henderson. See 562 U.S. at 441 
(holding that the 120-day notice requirement for filing an 
appeal with the Veteran’s Court “does not have jurisdictional 
                                              
9 While Appellee appears to object to the approach of 
interpreting Arbaugh in the context of an environmental case, 
we have already applied Arbaugh in concluding that the “civil 
action” requirement of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 is not a 
jurisdictional threshold. Beazer E., Inc., 525 F.3d at 260–61. 
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attributes”).10 The placement of the diligent prosecution bar 
within the “Notice” subsection suggests the diligent 
prosecution bar is also a claim-processing rule. Louisiana 
Envtl. Action Network, 677 F.3d at 748 (“The placement of 
the ‘diligent prosecution’ bar in the ‘Notice’ section, 
alongside a typical claim-processing rule, suggests that 
Congress intended the ‘diligent prosecution’ bar to be a 
claim-processing rule.”). 
    
 Our language in Student Public Interest Research 
Group and Baughman does not control. Neither case 
specifically addresses the question of jurisdiction, but rather 
both cases held that the administrative agency involved was 
not a “court” for the purpose of applying the diligent 
prosecution bar. Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of New 
Jersey, Inc., 759 F.2d at 1139; Baughman, 592 F.2d at 219. 
                                              
10 Appellee relies on Hallstrom v. Tillamook County for the 
proposition that “a plaintiff’s failure to abide by the identical 
notice requirements under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act . . . warranted dismissal for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.” (Appellee’s Br. 48) (citing 493 U.S. 20, 
23, 31 (1989)). We believe Appellee’s reliance on this case is 
misplaced, as the Hallstrom Court stated, “[t]he parties have 
framed the question presented in this case as whether the 
notice provision is jurisdictional or procedural. In light of our 
literal interpretation of the statutory requirement, we need not 
determine whether § 6972(b) is jurisdictional in the strict 
sense of the term.” 493 U.S. at 31. Therefore, the Court did 
not determine that this notice provision is jurisdictional. In 
fact, Hallstrom was decided before Arbaugh and Henderson, 
which themselves further defined the contours of 
jurisdictional provisions.    
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The approach taken in these cases predates the guidance set 
forth in Arbaugh. As the Supreme Court articulated, “the 
relevant question here is not” whether the diligent prosecution 
bar “itself has long been labeled jurisdictional, but whether 
the type of limitation that” the diligent prosecution bar 
“imposes is one that is properly ranked as jurisdictional 
absent an express designation.” Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. 
at 168. 
  
 In terms of the context of the diligent prosecution bar 
and the Supreme Court’s “interpretation of similar 
provisions,” the diligent prosecution bar is analogous to other 
mandatory, threshold requirements the Supreme Court has 
deemed nonjurisdictional in addition to the notice 
requirement in Henderson. See id. at 168–69 (holding that the 
Copyright Act’s requirement that copyright holders register 
their work before suing for copyright infringement is not a 
jurisdictional requirement); id. at 166 & n.6 (indicating that 
the Supreme Court in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216–17 
(2007) treated the administrative exhaustion requirement of 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 as 
nonjurisdictional); Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 (holding that “a 
timely charge of discrimination with the [Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission] is not a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to suit in federal court”). 
  
 Appellee presents legislative history in which the word 
“jurisdiction” was used in conjunction with the diligent 
prosecution bar. See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 37 (1970) (“[I]f 
the court viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would 
have jurisdiction to consider the citizen action 
notwithstanding any pending agency action.”). This language 
does not convince us that Congress intended the diligent 
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prosecution bar to be jurisdictional. It does appear that 
Congress intended the diligent prosecution bar to be a 
mandatory condition precedent to filing a citizen suit. 
Nevertheless as we have discussed, the actual text of the 
statute does not reference in any way or clearly suggest its 
intention to be jurisdictional, and its placement next to a 
claim-processing timing rule suggests it is a nonjurisdictional 
requirement. See Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 166 (stating 
that the Supreme Court has “treated as nonjurisdictional other 
types of threshold requirements that claimants must complete, 
or exhaust, before filing a lawsuit”).11   
    
 Congress did not clearly state or mandate that the 
diligent prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act “shall count as 
jurisdictional.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16. The text and 
placement of the specific provision reflect congressional 
intent that the limitation is a mandatory claim-processing rule 
designed “to promote the orderly progress of litigation” by 
ensuring the case is not already being diligently prosecuted. 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson, 562 U.S. at 435. It is 
particularly instructive that the Supreme Court has held 
similar mandatory threshold requirements are not 
jurisdictional limitations. We therefore conclude that the 
diligent prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act is 
nonjurisdictional. 
    
                                              
11 There is no historical treatment of the diligent prosecution 
bar to discuss because the Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed the jurisdictional nature of § 7604(b)(1)(B). Thus, 
we lack “a long line of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions” to 
instruct our analysis. Henderson ex rel. Henderson, 562 U.S. 
at 436 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).           
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 B. Analysis    
 The Clean Air Act provides that citizens may 
commence a civil action on their own behalf against a person 
or entity alleged to be in violation of an emission standard or 
limitation set forth under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1). 
This citizen suit provision is subject to an important 
limitation, at issue in the present case: 
 
No action may be commenced— 
 . . . 
if the Administrator or State has commenced 
and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a 
court of the United States or a State to require 
compliance with the standard, limitation, or 
order, but in any such action in a court of the 
United States any person may intervene as a 
matter of right. 
 
 Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B). We have commented that there is 
“extensive legislative history to establish that Congress 
intended citizen suits to both goad the responsible agencies to 
more vigorous enforcement of the anti-pollution standards 
and, if the agencies remained inert, to provide an alternate 
enforcement mechanism.” Baughman, 592 F.2d at 218. 
However, we have also noted that the “same legislative 
history also indicates ‘that Congress intended to provide for 
citizens’ suits in a manner that would be least likely to clog 
already burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger 
governmental action which would alleviate any need for 
judicial relief.’” Id. (quoting City of Highland Park v. Train, 
519 F.2d 681, 690–91 (7th Cir. 1975)); see also Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 
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60 (1987) (“The bar on citizen suits when governmental 
enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen suit 
is meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental 
action.”). We consider these policies in assessing the 
Appellant’s arguments. 
 
  1. Standard of Review  
 We must decide whether the District Court correctly 
determined that GASP could not advance a citizen suit 
because of the diligent prosecution bar. We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. CNA, 535 
F.3d at 139. In so doing, we must ask whether GASP has 
failed to state a claim. To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim,12 “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “In this review, courts 
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine 
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the 
                                              
12 Although this case was decided by the District Court as a 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, consistent with our discussion, supra, regarding 
the nonjurisdictional nature of § 7604(b), we will decide this 
case under 12(b)(6) standards. We note Shenango’s initial 
motion to dismiss was based on both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), 
and the District Court should have used the 12(b)(6) standard. 
We may affirm the judgment of the District Court for any 
reason supported by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 
F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 
118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
   
 We may review the 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 
Consent Order and Agreement in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as “it is the usual 
practice for a court to consider only the allegations contained 
in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and 
matters of public record.” City of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn 
Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation 
omitted); accord Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White 
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 
“Courts have defined a public record, for purposes of what 
properly may be considered on a motion to dismiss, to include 
. . . letter decisions of government agencies . . . and published 
reports of administrative bodies.” Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 998 F.2d at 1197 (citations omitted); see also Schmidt 
v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (determining that 
Securities and Exchange Commission filings are also matters 
of public record appropriately considered in reviewing a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). Further, courts may consider 
exhibits attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if it is 
“an undisputedly authentic document” and “plaintiff’s claims 
are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 
998 F.2d at 1196. 
  
 The 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 Consent Order 
and Agreement are public records as they are court decisions 
and final judgments. Further, the 2014 Consent Order and 
Agreement was an exhibit attached to the complaint. Portions 
of the 2012 Consent Decree were attached to the complaint, 
 20 
 
but the full document was only attached to the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss. The 2012 Consent Decree is undisputedly 
authentic as neither party nor the District Court has 
questioned its authenticity. GASP’s claims were based on the 
Consent Decree, specifically GASP’s contention that the 
2012 Consent Decree does not require compliance with the 
Act. Our reliance on these Consent Decrees in the context of 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is appropriate. 
        
  2. Were the agencies “prosecuting” an 
action? 
  
 Appellant argues that the term “prosecuting” in the 
diligent prosecution bar “requires an agency enforcement 
action to be pending in court if it is to bar a citizen suit.” 
(Appellant’s Br. 26). The argument follows that because the 
2012 and 2014 civil actions culminated in final judgments, 
they were not pending before a court when GASP filed its 
citizen suit, and therefore the Consent Decrees from these 
actions could not support a diligent prosecution bar. This 
issue is one of first impression in this Court. We have little 
difficulty in holding that when a state or federal agency 
diligently prosecutes an underlying action in court, the 
diligent prosecution bar will prohibit citizen suits during the 
actual litigation as well as after the litigation has been 
terminated by a final judgment, consent decree, or consent 
order and agreement.  In addition, when a state or federal 
agency diligently pursues an ongoing consent decree that may 
be modified by the parties and enforced by the agency, the 
diligent prosecution bar will prohibit citizen suits. We note 
that the parties in the present case were still able to modify or 
enforce the 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 Consent Order 
and Agreement and the District Court correctly found that the 
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ACHD was “diligently prosecuting” the case by taking 
actions that furthered the goals of these Consent Decrees, 
which was compliance with the regulations. 
 
 In addition, case law from other circuit courts supports 
the proposition that if the underlying case was diligently 
pursued, the diligent prosecution bar will apply even though 
an agency has entered into a consent decree with a polluter 
following a civil or administrative action. See N. & S. Rivers 
Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 
(1st Cir. 1991) (“The focus of the statutory bar to citizen’s 
suits is not on state statutory construction, but on whether 
corrective action already taken and diligently pursued by the 
government seeks to remedy the same violations as 
duplicative civilian action.”); see also Piney Run Pres. Ass’n 
v. Cnty. Comm’rs. of Carroll Cnty., Md., 523 F.3d 453, 459 
(4th Cir. 2008) (stating that “when presented with a consent 
decree” following a completed administrative agency 
proceeding, “we must be particularly deferential to the 
agency’s expertise”); Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1197–
98 (10th Cir. 2007) (determining that a citizen suit was barred 
because “the EPA’s prosecution,” a consent decree previously 
entered into, “was diligent”); Supporters to Oppose Pollution, 
Inc. v. Heritage Grp., 973 F.2d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(stating that the diligent prosecution bar in the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act “permits a follow-on private 
suit if the public suit was not prosecuted diligently. But if the 
agency prevails in all respects, that is the end . . . .”). Courts 
have concluded, in cases similar to ours, that consent decrees 
already entered into by administrative agencies and polluting 
entities were capable of constituting diligent prosecutions. 
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 Within this Circuit, we note that a district court has 
determined that the diligent prosecution bar applied to a 
consent order in Citizens for Clean Power v. Indian River 
Power, LLC, 636 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358 (D. Del. 2009). An 
environmental organization sent a notice of intent to sue to 
the defendant, prompting the administrative agencies to file 
suit against the defendant and propose a consent order. Id. at 
354. On February 13, 2009, the Delaware Superior Court 
entered the consent order, and on February 26, 2009, the 
organization filed its citizen suit against the same defendant. 
Id. at 354–55. The court found that the agency “diligently 
prosecuted its suit against defendant, which preclude[ed] 
plaintiff’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B).” Id. at 358.13  
 
      Appellant relies on cases that “employ[] a literal, 
inflexible interpretation compelled by the clear and 
unambiguous language of the Act.” Friends of Milwaukee’s 
Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 
754 (7th Cir. 2004). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas compared the date the plaintiffs’ complaint 
was filed with the date final judgment was entered in the 
pending case, finding it “clear the state of Texas was actually 
prosecuting [an applicable civil action] on the date the 
plaintiffs filed their original complaint.” Glazer v. Am. 
                                              
13 In Citizens for Clean Power, the District Court did not 
squarely address the present argument of whether 
“prosecuting” includes consent decrees from civil actions that 
resulted in a final judgment. Just as the District Court in this 
case proceeded, the Citizens for Clean Power case impliedly 
answered this question affirmatively, evidenced by its 
analysis of whether the prosecution was “diligent.” 636 F. 
Supp. 2d at 357–58.  
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Ecology Envtl. Servs. Corp., 894 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (E.D. 
Tex. 1995). Appellant additionally relies on cases from within 
this Circuit where a district court applied a literal and 
grammatical analysis to conclude a diligent prosecution bar 
did not apply. United States v. Sunoco, Inc. 501 F. Supp. 2d 
656, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“The statute speaks in the present 
and present perfect tense: it only applies if [the agency] ‘has 
commenced’ and ‘is diligently prosecuting’ a civil action in 
court; or if it ‘is in litigation’ . . . .”); Pub. Interest Research 
Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 770 F. Supp. 943, 949 
(D.N.J. 1991) (stating that the statute “speaks in the present 
tense” and it “does not state that a citizen suit is barred if a 
state has prosecuted an action with respect to such violations, 
although Congress could have easily so provided”). 
 
 We reject cases cited by Appellant which rely on a 
literal, inflexible, or grammatical interpretation. We conclude 
instead that if a state or administrative agency diligently 
prosecuted a suit, the presence of a final judgment, consent 
decree, or consent order and agreement will not prevent 
application of the diligent prosecution bar. 
   
 The circumstances of this case show ongoing diligent 
prosecution. The Consent Decrees provide a means to seek 
court intervention in the event of continuing violations. (App. 
105–06, 168–69). This provides a speedy and efficient means 
to enforce an order mandating compliance with the 
regulations without having to initiate a separate lawsuit. 
Moreover, the 2012 Consent Decree includes a “Continuing 
Jurisdiction” provision, providing that the District Court 
“shall retain jurisdiction from the date of entry of this 
Consent Decree through the date of termination of this Decree 
for the purpose of modifying, construing and/or enforcing the 
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rights and obligations of the Parties to this Consent Decree.” 
(App. 168). The Decree defines “termination” by requiring 
Shenango to file a motion with the Court demonstrating its 
compliance with the terms of the Decree. (Id. at 169–70). The 
2014 Consent Order and Agreement, in a section titled 
“Effective Date and Termination,” states that “[i]t is the 
intention of the parties that they will move jointly to 
terminate this Agreement” either three years from the 
effective date of the Agreement, or once Shenango 
demonstrates sufficient compliance with the terms of the 
Order and Agreement, whichever is sooner. (Id. at 105–06). 
No such motion was filed when GASP filed its citizen suit. 
The ACHD also retains its authority “to seek further 
enforcement of this Agreement in the event Shenango fails to 
successfully comply with its terms and conditions.” (Id. at 
95). Both the 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 Consent Order 
and Agreement utilize ongoing monitoring and recording of 
Shenango’s emissions, as well as allow ACHD the right to 
inspect Shenango’s facilities or record emissions. (Id. at 99–
101) (2014 Consent Order and Agreement); (Id. at 130–33, 
145–46) (2012 Consent Decree). 
   
 It is undisputed by their own terms that the 2012 
Consent Decree and 2014 Consent Order and Agreement 
were still in effect when GASP filed its citizen suit. 
Therefore, although the actions culminated in final 
judgments, the principal enforcement mechanism against 
Shenango for these Clean Air Act violations remained in 
place. 
      
 We are reminded that the legislative history of the 
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act suggests that 
“the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to 
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supplant governmental action.” Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 
484 U.S. at 60. Legislative history surrounding the citizen suit 
provision of the Clean Water Act provides that “[t]he 
Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions 
be brought by the State” and that the citizen suit is 
appropriate only “if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail 
to exercise their enforcement responsibility.” S. Rep. No. 92-
414, at 64 (1971); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 
60. 
    
 Appellant is correct that no circuit court has squarely 
addressed whether the term “prosecuting” in the diligent 
prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act requires an agency 
enforcement action to be pending in court when the citizen 
suit is filed. Courts have impliedly answered this question 
through their decisions on whether to enforce a diligent 
prosecution bar when faced with a recent consent decree. Our 
decision hinges on the circumstances of this case and the 
ongoing vitality of these Consent Decrees, specifically the 
parties’ ability to modify or enforce the terms of the Consent 
Decrees. 
     
  3. Does the prosecution “require 
compliance” with the Act? 
  
 The Clean Air Act states that diligent prosecution must 
“require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order” of 
the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B). We note that the 
government’s prosecution is entitled to great deference. Karr, 
475 F.3d at 1198 (quoting Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer 
Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1324 (S.D. Iowa 1997)); Friends of 
Milwaukee’s Rivers, 382 F.3d at 760; see also N. & S. Rivers 
Watershed Ass’n, Inc., 949 F.2d at 557 (“Where an agency 
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has specifically addressed the concerns of an analogous 
citizen’s suit, deference to the agency’s plan of attack should 
be particularly favored.”). The question of whether the 
prosecution is diligent is related to the question of whether 
the prosecution requires compliance with the Act, as both 
involve the merits of the alleged prosecution. Therefore, we 
are mindful that “when presented with a consent decree we 
must be particularly deferential to the agency’s expertise.” 
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 523 F.3d at 459. 
  
 GASP alleges that the 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 
Consent Order and Agreement do not require compliance 
with the Act with respect to the twenty and sixty percent 
combustion stack opacity requirements and the five percent 
door emissions violations. GASP further argues that because 
Shenango has continued to violate these provisions since the 
effective date of the Consent Decree and Consent Order and 
Agreement the Consent Decrees do not require compliance 
with the Act. We agree with the District Court that “[o]n 
balance, the 2012 and 2014 [Consent Decrees] demonstrate 
that the ACHD is in the process of diligently prosecuting and 
enforcing the same violations alleged in the instant lawsuit.” 
(App. 9). 
  
 We first consider the contention that the ACHD’s 
actions in 2012 and 2014 do not require compliance with the 
sixty percent and twenty percent combustion stack opacity 
requirements. The 2012 Consent Decree addresses these 
violations. In a section titled “Compliance With Applicable 
Laws,” the Decree states that “[n]othing contained in this 
Consent Decree shall be construed to relieve Defendant of 
obligations to comply with all applicable federal, state, and 
local regulations, statutes, and laws, including but not limited 
 27 
 
to” the Clean Air Act, the Pennsylvania SIP, and the ACHD 
Rules and Regulations. (App. 164). This Consent Decree 
specifically requires compliance with both the twenty percent 
and sixty percent combustion stack opacity standards: 
  
Defendant shall not operate, or allow to be 
operated, any battery of coke ovens at the 
Facility in such manner that, at any time, 
emissions from any coke oven battery 
combustion stack at the Facility (including 
emissions from the COB S-1 combustion 
stack):  
 . . . 
b. equal or exceed any opacity of 20% for a 
period or periods aggregating in excess of three 
(3) minutes in any 60 minute period; or  
c. equal or exceed any opacity of 60% at 
any time.  
(App. 126–27). The Decree was still effective when GASP 
filed its citizen suit, as the District Court retained jurisdiction. 
(App. 168). 
   
 We next consider GASP’s contention that the Consent 
Decrees do not require compliance with the five percent door 
emissions standard. The 2014 Consent Order and Agreement 
addresses the five percent door emissions violations. The 
Consent Order and Agreement states that “the ACHD has 
found and determined . . . . [e]xcess visible emissions from 
the door areas of Battery S-1 in violation of Section 
2105.21.b.1,” which is the five percent door emissions 
standard of the ACHD Rules and Regulations. (App. 4, 89–
90). In addition to assessing a civil penalty for these 
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violations, the Agreement set forth measures to address the 
five percent door emissions violations, “to enhance the 
control of . . . coke oven door emissions” and implement 
“[d]oor inspection procedures [that] have been revised to 
include a door change-out program of 1 to 2 doors/week.” 
(App. 94, 102). This Agreement was still effective when 
GASP filed its citizen suit and the ACHD retained the 
authority “to seek further enforcement of this Agreement.” 
(App. 95, 105–06). 
    
 The 2012 Consent Decree and 2014 Consent Order 
and Agreement adequately set forth ACHD’s approach with 
respect to these three Clean Air Act violations at issue with 
Shenango which include monitoring the violator, providing 
for penalties in the event of violations, and requiring the 
violator to bear the cost of improvement. Concluding that this 
approach does not require compliance with the Act when the 
Consent Decrees specifically reference and address these 
three violations would question the agency’s expertise and 
contradict the accepted practice of giving deference to the 
diligence of the agency’s prosecution. GASP’s apparent 
dissatisfaction with the 2012 Consent Decree led to a 
subsequent civil action and the 2014 Consent Order and 
Agreement. Taken together, these Consent Decrees address 
GASP’s contentions. “Merely because the State may not be 
taking the precise action Appellant wants it to or moving with 
the alacrity Appellant desires does not entitle Appellant to 
injunctive relief.” N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc., 949 
F.2d at 558. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s 
finding that ACHD’s diligent prosecution “requires 
compliance” with the Act. 





 In deciding this case, we have determined that the 
diligent prosecution bar of the Clean Air Act is a claim-
processing rule, not a jurisdictional limitation, and should 
have been dealt with under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 
12(b)(1). GASP has failed to state a cause of action in its 
citizen suit because of the diligent prosecution bar. The 
ACHD diligently prosecuted the same three Clean Air Act 
violations GASP now attempts to litigate. The ACHD entered 
into a Consent Decree and Consent Order and Agreement 
with Shenango which were still in effect when GASP filed its 
citizen suit. ACHD’s prosecution requires compliance with 
the Act. We hold that when a state or federal agency 
diligently prosecutes an underlying action in court, the 
diligent prosecution bar will prohibit citizen suits during the 
actual litigation as well as after the litigation has been 
terminated by a final judgment, consent decree, or consent 
order and agreement.  In addition, when a state or federal 
agency diligently pursues an ongoing consent decree that may 
be modified by the parties and enforced by the agency, the 
diligent prosecution bar will prohibit citizen suits. 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s Order 
granting Shenango’s motion to dismiss, albeit for somewhat 
different reasons.    
